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My dysphoria blues: Or why I cannot write an autoethnography. 
In this essay I would like to ask if we are concerned with writing about difference or writing 
differently. I attempt to present an account of my on-going experience of dysphoria and consider 
how I write about that experience. I reveal how my writing has no epiphany, is repetitive and in its 
characterless depiction of others is a 2-dimensional, monologue that fails the conventions of an 
evocative autoethnographic account. My writing is ‘bad writing’ but what should become of it? Does 
a concern with style, whether or not over content, based on taste preclude some stories and 
different ways of writing? Should I be excluded from academe and silenced, or can room be found 
for a tasteless account like mine? I end my essay by provocatively owning the label of bad writing. 
 
In this essay I wish to consider my somatic experience of managing dysphoria and reflect a little on 
writing autoethnographically. My account veers from a reflexive narrative of life events already lived 
and understood towards a presentation of an unfolding life as it is lived. I thus wish to ask a 
question: is my processual account more one where I muddle through and learn by doing than a 
reflexive one? More pointedly – do I write autoethnographically or is it merely self-indulgent, bad 
writing?   
This essay is a subjective, emotive, and at times, visceral account of two aspects of my life as a non-
binary transgender person - transition and dysphoria. (I am ‘non-binary’ as I do not identify as either 
male or female.) Transition and dysphoria appear as tropes in official medical narratives and many 
lay autobiographies of transsexual folk (Prosser 1998) but whilst they are pertinent to my life I would 
contend that it is not in the way those official narratives suggest. My concern with dysphoria arises 
as it is officially presented as the cause of transsexuality but a cause overcome by transition. 
Transition and dysphoria officially are thus definitional of the transsexual subject but rather 
strangely transition negates dysphoria and so erases the transsexual subject. My experience of 
dysphoria differs and may offer a counter-narrative that adds a different voice and understanding of 
this complicated trope. I find they cross over, inter-relate and become braided together in a way 
glossed by official narratives. That I cannot untangle this braid, part constitutional of my lived life, is 
evident in my narrative where there is often not a clear boundary between the two and one infects 
and provides meaning for the other.  
My story is one where an un-reflexive self endures, rather than achieves, (self-)improvement. Such a 
meta-reflection on reflexivity and what it means to write subjectively may be of interest to those 
concerned with writing differently and with issues of (self-)knowledge and learning. It is an essay 
that contains more questions than answers – how can I find answers to my life even whilst it 
unravels as I blunder through repeating past mistakes and making new ones?  This essay makes very 
little attempt to explain my life to a reader; it does not convince by logic, rational argument or 
weight of objective evidence and analysis but attempts an emotional resonance through an 
evocation of an abject life not by writing well but by writing badly.   
 
Bad writing 
Since Geertz (1977. See also Clifford 1988; Clifford and Marcus, 1986) first wrote of ‘the crisis of 
representation’ autoethnography has become an established method and voice in social science. For 
Anzaldúa (1981 and 1987) writing about difference, or rather writing difference, is not just for those 
able to write well, different voices, particularly those so often silenced by the demands of academic 
writing, must also be heard. In autoethnography – and I would suggest in academe generally - 
difference is something we write of but often excluded from how we write: one must write well or 
not at all. 
Autoethnography, often criticised as a self-indulgent narcissism made public, is considered credible 
when a reader is convinced that the story is plausible (Ellis et al., 2010). Plausibility requires an 
evocative account where a reader can follow a narrative path toward an intended conclusion. 
Autoethnography, in short, should have the aesthetic merit of being a coherent, consistent, 
convincing and well written teleological story ‘capable of being respected by critics of literature as 
well as social scientists’ (Denzin, 1997, 200 quoted in Spry, 2001 713). It is not sufficient to write and 
reflect on one’s life; one must also write well. 
Le Roux (2017), following Pace (2012), suggests autoethnography be considered as a continuum 
ranging between the evocative and the analytic: the first conveys emotional experience and achieves 
an emotional resonance (Anderson, 2006); the second narrativises one’s experience as empirical 
evidence for analysis to theorise broader social issues. Maréchal (2009) adds a third – 
postmodern/post structural accounts that may be fragmented and include multiple viewpoints and 
may overlap with ‘new ethnography’ (Goodall, 2006). Regardless of the paradigmatic differences 
evident between analytic and evocative standpoints both require autoethnography to achieve 
aesthetic merit and reflexivity. Autoethnographic accounts must satisfy both academic and literary 
criteria or be deemed ‘bad’. Given this emphasis on aesthetic merit I beg to ask if one must remain 
silent if one writes poorly?  
I am no Proust able to evoke lost time, what I write is mediocre. I was never taught how to write at 
school, we were just expected to get on with it. It really didn’t matter what we wrote just so long as 
we wrote something, anything. If we wrote enough we would surely learn how to write well through 
osmosis and repetition. But the lie evident in the enthusiastic cry ‘just write’ was made clear when 
my essays were returned with words, phrases, sentences and whole paragraphs circled, underlined 
and crossed out. With every mistake underlined in red the page changed colour. The barbed 
comments about my rebarbative writing summarised as a percentage easily mistakable for a mark 
out of ten. ‘See me!! Incorrect use of the subjunctive!!!’ My writing was judged so bad that one 
exclamation mark was not enough. My English teacher’s annoyance made manifest by how hard she 
had pressed her biro to etch those words onto all the succeeding pages of my work book and so 
predict that all my subsequent attempts would also contain an ‘incorrect use of the subjunctive!!!’  
But still I didn’t learn. Aged 12 I didn’t know what my teacher meant by ‘subjunctive’ and I still do 
not. Then, as now, my essays are poorly written, repetitive, grammatically flawed on a line by line 
basis, of no interest to a reader and in a nut shell plain badly written. I am a bad writer but does this 
mean I have nothing worth saying?  
Much of what I write is laboured and tendentious – a tendency Grey and Sinclair (2006) express 
aesthetic concern over. They regard bad writing as deliberative of a pretentiousness and obfuscation 
that does not aim to convince through clarity of prose but confound and confuse and one often 
reliant on multiple academic citations. And not just any citations but those of white, male, Anglo-
European obscure philosophers misunderstood by all but the authors, and best of all dead. Citation 
not a means to support an argument but to show off how much one has read rather than how well 
one reads: never mind the quality, feel the width. Bad writing goes hand in hand with bad reading. 
They exhort us instead to ‘write more stylishly and accessibly’ (449) because: 
Good writing is suggestive and pungent, it evokes feelings—relief, recognition, drama, disdain, 
horror—and bodily responses—the flush of recognition and the sharp intake of breath, the tingle as 
we feel that this might be showing us something we hadn’t thought or experienced before. Good 
writing is often unpredictable—shocking in its terseness or economy, audacious in its sudden sweep 
or the intimacy of a confidence. (452) 
 
At first this concern appears to echo Sedgwick’s (1990) bearding of much of academic prose as ‘flat’ 
but it goes much further. For Sedgwick, or at last what I understand by her, academic writing often 
assumes a neutral, thus supposedly objective, voice and authorial distance in contrast to prose that 
forsakes distance in its audacity not to shock but emotionally affect a reader. To describe academic 
writing as ‘flat’ does not however dismiss it as ‘bad’ – indeed Sedgwick (1987) uses both flat and 
emotive prose for different ends -  but rather provides a descriptive label. Flat writing has a certain 
logic, purpose, and is allowed a space.  
 
My writing is a ‘corrupted reflexivity … [as a] self-flagellating defence against criticism’ (Grey and 
Sinclair, 2006, 447). Masochism writ large; bad writing indeed. Good writing has no truck with 
difference and no taste for ‘modes other than the declamatory or the plain’ (Hayot, 2014, 59) little 
realising that such judgements are only an expression of an equally self-indulgent sense of taste. 
Good writing, palisaded behind a once arbitrary but now objectified sense of taste, excludes what it 
is not, not through self-flagellation but through a narcissistic inflation of ego that achieves its purity 
by denying a world of difference (Bersani and Phillips, 2008).  Writing differently or cant?  
 
I am not a critical management scholar or for that matter an academic but nonetheless feel the 
weight of Grey and Sinclair’s (2006) judgement.  The demand of good writing fills me with dread and 
despair and nearly scares me into silence. But I have learnt to be self-indulgent over many years and 
even if my writing is habitually bad no longer feel bad about it.  
 
It’s all about me and writing transgender narratives 
Anteby (2013) argues that autoethnography is particularly suited for management research 
concerned with diversity and the experiences of marginalised identities since it ‘lend[s] visibility to 
less common experience’ (1284). These subjective accounts provide both a proximal account and 
understanding and add polyvocality to the more distanced, neutral and objective accounts more 
common place. They rely not just on the writer’s presence in the narrative but also on analysing 
their personal investment and involvement to lay bare the exotic within the mundane as if the 
mundane was not sufficient (Poulos, 2009). For Poulos the secrets, lies and contradictions of an 
otherwise mundane life may stretch it so thin as to break its elastic limit. These thin descriptions 
may reveal a dark side for ethnography to explore issues of vulnerability and abjection to 
complement Geertz’s (1973) cry for thick ones. Such self-reflexivity whilst ‘noticeably absent from 
contemporary organizational scholarship’ (Anteby, 2013, 1281) may be particularly suited to writing 
transgender stories.  
Away from management academia Jay Prosser (1998) discusses both autobiographical accounts of 
being transsexual and how transsexual subjects are often depicted in official accounts to question 
the trope of ‘transition’ for us trans folk. Transsexual autobiographies are considered to provide a 
potential counter narrative to the official, often medicalised, descriptions of us. Prosser places 
considerably more emphasis than Anteby on the potential politics involved between officially 
sanctioned and counter narratives. The former are about but fundamentally not ours yet the latter 
may be dismissed as vanity projects particularly if they do not cleave to official analysis and tropes.  
Since Brewis et al (1997) first wrote in a management and organizational context about transgender 
folk there remain very few accounts of us folk in managerial and organizational settings. Those that 
exist allegorise (Brewis et al 1997; Pullen and Rhodes, 2013; Pullen et al 2017), or provide qualitative 
empirical examples ranging from those where a researcher tells our stories (Muhr and Sullivan, 
2013; Muhr, Sullivan and Rich, 2015; Schilt, 2006; Schilt and Connell, 2007; Schilt and Westbrook, 
2009 ) to self-reflexive accounts (Author, 2016 and 2018; Thanem, 2011; Thanem and Knights, 2012; 
Thanem and Wallenberg, 2015). This polyphony of methodological concerns and understandings 
present transgender as a polyseme but where it is not always evident which transgender folk are 
represented by the stories told. 
Transgender, commonly considered an ‘umbrella term’ under which those whose gender 
presentation differs from that required by a normative society, is based on a heterosexual binary 
(Butler 1990, 1993). The umbrella includes but is not limited to, for instance, cross-dressers, 
transvestites, drag kings and queens, and transsexual folk but where transsexuality is considered 
more narrowly as grounded in genital dysphoria. Dysphoria here results in a desire to undergo an 
invasive, difficult and high risk medical transition to align external appearance with internalised 
identity where a male subject becomes female, or vice versa, to achieve coherence between 
ontological and somatic selves in a story grounded in presumptions of a binarized cis-normativity 
(Butler, 1990).  
Transition provides the basis of mirror stories that dominate our subjective, unofficial biographies 
where a post-surgery person finally regards their reflection as their true self, official medical stories, 
and popular media accounts of transsexuality (Prosser, 1998). To be officially regarded as 
transsexual both grounds and starts the treatment pathway for transsexual folk: one must identify 
first as a transsexual to be referred for multiple psychological assessment that formally diagnosis the 
condition of transsexuality. It is only once one has an official diagnosis that transition officially starts: 
this narrative glosses that one must first be transsexual to be diagnosed as transsexual and so be 
permitted to become transsexual (Spade, 2006). A failure to establish and repeat this circle carries a 
heavy price – the removal of care. (See Spade, 2006 for a description of how treatment was withheld 
from him in the US of A. In the UK medical treatment only commences after multiple diagnoses and 
reassessments. Break this circle and treatment may be withdrawn or withheld.)  
I was first referred by my GP for treatment in March 2015; my first diagnosis was in July 2016, 
confirmed by a different specialist in October and who approved the commencement of hormone 
treatment in January 2017. It is now March 2018 and I wait for a transfer to another specialist for 
conformation of my diagnosis only after which will I be referred to a specialist surgeon where my 
diagnosis will again be discussed. If surgery is approved I will then join a waiting list for surgery. It is 
not without irony that trans folk repeatedly question this circular pathway.   
It is not just the official narratives however that gloss how we trans folk move through repetitive 
diagnostic stages toward an eventual treatment and ‘cure’. The dominant lay story of transition is 
one written post-transition where the one who writes recalls both their past divided selves and 
reveals themselves to be what those divided selves wished to become but is otherwise absent from 
the story. Retrospection allows for a coherent teleological story as a clear path through life is 
revealed and where any dead ends, aimless wanderings or circular routes taken can be glossed. 
These stories reveal a strange erasure where the one who writes is not the persons written of and 
where the subjects of the story desire their own erasure and are no longer here; the writers have 
transitioned are cured of and sundered from their past. The subject of transition is an un-reflexive 
dupe waiting for the Godot writing their story to finally, hopefully, wistfully make an appearance, 
but an appearance that presages the subject’s demise.  
An alternative and often transphobic media story of transition refuses to let go of a past preferred 
lost in the previous lay accounts. This lost past – the historical, biographical self - is dragged up in 
such a way that newspapers present trans folk as ‘X’ born ‘Y’ to question the validity of ‘X’. This is 
less a past self subsumed in to the present than one invoked to undo the reality of the present 
where, for instance, Caitlyn Jenner will never be allowed to be a ‘real’ woman (Author 2016). Such 
transphobic narratives are not Hegelian narratives of improvement but instead condemn us to an 
endlessly repeated past co-existent with a present to negate different futures. 
These timeless stories cross each other to form a subject supposedly made whole through reflexivity 
and knowledge that Leo Bersani (2013) critiques as a Cartesian spectral figure neither present here 
nor quite there that has abandoned its past. This however is not my story.  I have never had an 
epiphany. I have never looked in a mirror to have a road to Damascus revelation and suddenly seen 
myself anew. I have instead always been becoming trans.  
Against the official medical story, the dominant lay narrative and popular media accounts is a fourth 
story but one that Prosser (1998) argues is seldom told – that of ‘transitioning’ subjects rather than 
of transition past. Lives lived rarely follow simple, coherent pathways toward a definite goal but are 
messy, full of wrong turns and contain misunderstandings, mistakes, secrets and lies (Goodall, 2006). 
A ‘transitioning’ story is a processual memoir rather than an autobiographical recollection. As 
memoir it is not written by a better self who has learnt the lessons of their past but instead reveals a 
flawed subject who makes, and often repeats the same, mistakes; who stumbles through life unsure 
of where their path takes them and what the future may hold and what direction to follow. As 
Peppiatt (2015: ix) writes a memoir ‘far from the objective account of a life… presents an intimate, 
revealing portrait… in a way that no formal biography could convey’.  In a memoir we may carry our 
past with us not as something we already understand, have learnt from and so directs our steps 
along the correct path in life but instead as memories that help orientate us towards and suggest 
possible futures (Ahmed, 2006).  It is here, I would suggest, that we might begin to find my counter 
narrative to transition.  
My mum tells me that I chose to wear my sister’s clothes aged 4 (author, 2017). A photo of me aged 
15 - pink Mohican, ripped CRASS t-shirt, DMs and a black skirt. Another aged 19 – an early girlfriend 
wraps her arms around me and we smile into the camera. I’m clearly wearing a pale blue dress 
covered in white embroidered birds in the photo. I came out to her a few years back and she 
responded by saying, ‘That doesn’t surprise me at all. It was always obvious.’  There has been no 
epiphany; I have always been transsexual yet I am only now officially in transition.  
Those who are non-binary are erased from an official narrative where binary transsexuals exist pre- 
or post-transition but never as transitioning. In a concern to write about difference we should not 
lose a focus on a diversity of voices and identities.  
I write while under erasure. 
My UK passport allows me only to be male or female and my driving license codes me as female. Only 
one or the other, never both, never neither, and never between. The UK Ministry of Justice says non-
binary folk do not exits. I have been told frequently by some binary transsexuals that non-binary 
‘ruin’ things for them as they turn away and refuse to accept us under the transgender umbrella. For 
many non-binary is an embarrassment, something to deride and pour scorn on, something to deny 
three times before their sun rise. 
This is my memoir as a non-binary person writing of my desire not to be a binary sex/gender and 
where my dysphoria queers official and lay binary transgender tropes. Bad writing by a ‘bad 
transsexual’.  
I have always been trans… 
... But I have also long been dysphoric and the latter may not simply be formative of the former. Not 
all transsexual folk experience dysphoria despite it being a definitional trope to the extent of desiring 
medical transition. Some of us may never transition, others may transition but have a different 
experience of dysphoria, and some may be dysphoric but do not want to align body with an internal 
sense of self (Bornstein, 1994; Author, 2017).  
 
My dysphoria blues. A non-binary counter narrative 
The needle slides in and I watch blood flow in to the first of three small, coloured ampules. 
‘It’s a small price to pay to be happy. You must be so much happier now that you can be you!’ I look 
at the practice nurse taking my blood for my routine quarterly hormone level analysis.  
Haven’t I always been me? Briefly, oh so very briefly, I contemplate my reply, before concurring, ‘Yes, 
you’re right, I’m so much happier now.’ I tell her nothing of the verbal abuse and physical and sexual 
assaults that I routinely experience. I tell her nothing of the poverty and unemployment that is my 
unchanging life. There’s no point. 
Why did I tell the practice nurse that transition makes me happy? She expects affirmation of the 
official monosemic understanding of trans folk where we are expected to desire transition to align a 
sense of self with a somatic reality and where dysphoria is presumed localised at erogenous zones. A 
belief that also forms the basis of popular lay ‘sex change’ stories (Prosser, 1998).  Such an alignment 
supposedly reduces dysphoria and consequently increase positive affective states, including 
happiness. It is not however my experience and story – my dysphoria is not localised erogenically but 
is felt elsewhere - at my neck, left shin and left arm. Despite this my official NHS narrative not only 
talks of genital dysphoria, it ignores my actual dysphoria.  
The clinician asks about dysphoria and I tell her how I dislike certain parts of my body but not why. 
She shows no interest, takes no notes and stops me to pointedly ask instead about sex. I describe 
myself as anally passive. She perks up, ‘So you don’t like your penis?’  
‘I don’t hate it. I’ve gotten used to having one. I just prefer only to urinate with it.’ 
‘But you don’t like it sexually.’ A statement not a question. She starts writing once more. My notes 
now describe me as dysphoric. 
My on-going transition has not decreased my dysphoria that still comes in waves so unbearable that 
I suffer suicidal ideation How might I reveal I manage ideation by self-harming when I know that to 
speak of either may result in the termination of treatment?  Even if she had the time to listen how 
do I speak to her when to talk about my life may drag up memories that trigger my dysphoria?  It is 
far easier to repeat the medicalised myth and say I’m happy and align with the official medical story 
of my life. I am left alone with it and must find a non-official means to cope. The circle remains 
unbroken. And so I self-harm.    
 
On my back in the dark 
New Year’s Eve 2015 I stand alone surrounded by revellers in a pub in Newcastle. A group of 4 or 5 
young guys lark about, daring each other to ‘twist his nipple’. I edge away not wanting to be caught 
up in audience participation.  But not far enough. One stagers towards me and then puts his arm 
around my neck and pulls me toward him. ‘Fuck off! Leave me alone. Get off me.’ I rage at him. 
Scalded he lets go. It’s impossible to know who is more embarrassed and shocked by my over-
reaction, him or me. I fill the silence, ‘Sorry it’s been a bad day.’ I don’t really know if I’m apologising 
to him or trying to excuse myself. And to what day do I refer?   
… 
47 years previously, engrossed in mimicing the few strokes of a pen by Givenchy for a dress design, I 
was oblivious to the world. Oblivious of my father, back from the parade ground, entering the room. 
Oblivious of him crossing the space between us to look over my shoulder at what I was doing. 
Oblivious until I felt his hand close under my chin and clamp tight around my neck and throat. 
Forced up slowly, very slowly by an inexorable, upward pressure, I rose from the chair to stand on tip 
toes as he stared at my sketches and the fashion magazine scattered across the kitchen table. ‘Why,’ 
he breathed in to my ear, ‘can’t you draw cars, or cowboys like the other boys?’ 
I had no answer, couldn’t answer, all I could think of was both my neck, suddenly very conscious of its 
fragility, and that I was slowly choking. More upward pressure and momentarily I dangelled off the 
floor. Then the hand was gone and I fell face forward down towards the table…  
‘Stop trying to scratch,’ my mum admonishes me. ‘You need to wear the brace a while yet. Maybe 
that will teach you not to ride your sister’s bike.’ And she gives me a long hard, quizzical look, ‘Funny 
how there’s no scrapes or bruises.’  
… 
Aged 14 I’m overly proud of my dress and take every opportunity to wear it outside school. At school 
I’m restricted to wearing the standard boy’s uniform of trousers, shirt and jumper but outside I can 
be myself, just another teenage punk dressed in ripped jeans, t-shirt, and an army surplus coat. And 
my sister’s dress. 
Last week school finished for Summer and tonight there’s a party to celebrate.  I make the rounds 
saying hello to friends, ignoring and avoiding enemies, a little curious about those I don’t know but 
am too shy to say hello to. I step in to kitchen to get a glass and bump in to my friend’s older sister. I 
chat to her briefly before her boyfriend appears and drags her away. She shouts, ‘Dump your coat in 
my bedroom.’   
The bedroom light is on and I chuck my coat on the pile. Feeling guilty but fascinated I look at the 
make-up arranged on the bedroom table. The door opens behind me and I mutter, ‘Just dump your 
coat with the others.’ The light goes out and I’m grabbed, spun round and pushed face down in to the 
pile of clothes. I’m pinned down by someone kneeling on my neck and back, my right arm caught 
underneath me, my left pulled up and to the side in an arm lock. 
‘Pull his pants down.’ There is more than one of them in the room. ‘Keep still poof. Your sort like this.’ 
Struggling for breath I feel something hard and cold pushed against my leg. ‘Stop struggling!’ 
…And I find myself on the settee at home. ‘Back in the land of the living? It must have been a good 
party.’ There’s a bucket next to me. I can smell Dettol, which adds to my feeling of nausea and 
disorientation. I’m not sure how I got here, I’ve blanked out hours of my life that I don’t want to think 
about.   
‘Um, sorry. Was I sick?’ 
‘Yes. Quite a bit but it doesn’t matter, everyone gets drunk at least once in their life. Tell me about 
the party’ 
‘I’ve got to go to the toilet.’ I rush upstairs and in to the bathroom where I lock the door.  Dry retching 
over with I sit on the toilet and try to ‘go’. ‘Going’ is incredibly, horribly, painful, like I’m shitting glass. 
It leaves me sobbing in pain, shaking, gasping for breath, in a cold sweat and on the verge of 
vomiting. Eventually I reach behind with a wad of toilet paper and try to wipe myself clean. The 
paper comes away soaked in blood, stained with shit. Blood and shit; I flush the paper away. Blood 
and shit; I flush me way.  
I sit there for a long moment wondering what to do next; scared what to do next. I can hear my mum 
moving about downstairs. Very soon she’ll want to know why I’m taking so long. I rifle through the 
bathroom cabinet and take a razor blade and track it down the length of my upper arm. Once, twice, 
I lose count of how many times I do this lost as I am in my desire to clean myself.  
Weeks later I confess to my mum that my arm has gone septic. She removes the bandage, ‘How on 
earth did you do this?’ My arm is a maze of infected cuts and scars, some oozing yellow pus. 
‘I fell off a bike. It’s road rash.’ I lie.  
‘But only hurt your arm? Really? No other cuts anywhere else? No bruises? Nothing?’ She stares at 
me, incredulous. She doesn’t believe me but I remain silent and eventually she lets it slide 
… 
1980. A tent in a field of tents away from the noise of the stage. In my afterglow I lie hidden from the 
world outside, protected by his encircling arms. I stretch against him as he stirs and gently runs his 
finger down my cheek and nuzzles and kisses my neck. Happy in his embrace I sigh wanting this 
moment to echo throughout my future years as something to remember and cherish.  
Samuel Beckett’s (1980) novella ‘Company’ repeats the refrain ‘you are on your back in the dark’ and 
through repetition asks if life is ceaseless repetition ‘with only minor variants the same bygone’ (5). 
Still later:  
Another trait the flat tone.  No life. Same flat tone at all times. For its affirmations. For its 
negations. For its interrogations. For its exclamations. For its imperations. Same flat tone. 
You were once. You were never. Were you ever? Oh never to have been! Be again. Same flat 
tone.’ 
Bersani (2013: 32) considers if memory ‘allows us to sequester the past in the past’ as a function of a 
supposedly conscious, thinking and reflexive subject. I have a wealth of memories both bad and 
good about my neck but some seem too much for me. The ellipses marking the start and end of the 
middle two of the four vignettes above hide what I do not remember, or perhaps more precisely, 
what I do not want to remember. The past is however not so easily sequestered. Whilst those 
ellipses mark memories I’d rather forget they still rear up to infect and stretch thin the mundane 
present (Poulos, 2006). In the absence of memory, in the void marked by three dots, I cannot reflect 
on, and so cannot learn from, what I wish to forget. In refusing to remember I may be doomed to 
drift aimless, lost in an open field previously traversed a thousand times before only to find myself 
still nowhere in particular. There is no epithany.  
Perhaps the closest I have ever come to an epiphany was the slow, rising realisation of my ex 
partner’s destructive transphobia. That dull, flat repetition enacted over more than 8 years (hardly an 
overnight revelation!) finally weighed so heavily on me that I could endure it no further. This was no 
epiphany but a flat despair I tried (but have not managed) to escape from, first by self-harming and 
then by exchanging one vulnerable life for another - poverty and homelessness in preference to the 
cyclical everyday similitude of marital abuse. It hardly matters; the same flat tone realised through 
dysphoria and self-harm. 
I am told that my writing is repetitive and that merely repeating a point does not make it more true.  
I am told that my repetitions detract from coherence as I circle round to find fault with, and pick 
holes in, things previously said. But I am not trying to establish a coherent truth. In repeating myself I 
want to question how things remain the same even whilst change occurs. Repetition allows me to 
revisit an event to draw out and dwell on different details and so add density to my account not 
through polyvocaility but polyseme. It lets me look at a single issue not to find similitude but 
different perspectives to try to capture a kaleidoscopic, if not a 3-dimensional, image.  My vignettes 
reveal what I know to be true - I don’t like my neck being touched as it nearly always seems to end in 
tears; mine. The same flat tone as a similitude calls up my rage where my neck is a locus of pain and 
painful memories. But is it only this? In raging I forget I once wanted someone to stroke my neck and 
for the memory of that touch to echo on forever – that truth seems lost amongst the others, hidden 
by the ellipses that hide what I do not remember and do not want to recall but cannot seem to 
forget. A truth forsaken to maintain the comforting silencing of others. Perhaps what I mistake for 
similitude is merely my ordering of disparate memories to make a coherent narrative.  
I am made worse than Beckett’s subject since I do not repeat experiences in a spiralling 
temporalisation (Bersani, 2013) that bring me back to myself changed but unchanging (Peppiatt, 
2015: 283-316). I instead seem to move along a hysteresis loop to find myself both back where I 
started but inverted. In raging at the poor guy in the bar I become what I fear most; my father 
mirrored in his child. Where is the polyvocality? My father does not have an opportunity to speak for 
himself in my vignette. He has no voice.  
The father whom I run from was once real. His biography would reveal the second youngest in a 
family of 11 brothers and sisters. A life of urban poverty in the slums of Cork, Dublin and Liverpool 
only escaped by joining the Army where he was stripped of his past to become a parade ground RSM 
and learnt to rage his pain at others (a mirror story of sorts). In my writing he has no vitality, no 
hopes, dreams or motivation other than to be brutal. I do not talk of a man who could be endlessly 
generous to his friends and found salvation in work but drowned himself in whiskey. I dehumanise 
him and replace his humanity with a vile brutality. Even if this was fiction he would make for a weak, 
shallow character but I victimise him in yet another cyclic repetition where abuser becomes abused 
by the abused; similitude achieved, the same flat tone. I invoke a 2-dimensional, depthless cipher to 
excuse myself of blame. If a researcher should aim to do no harm than I have failed quite 
spectacularly. This abhorrent child that I am is worse than the origin to write a self-flagellating, self-
shattering ego inflation that refuses both what it is and is not. I am no postmodern auto-
ethnographer. Bad writing. Indeed. 
 
My dysphoria once more – a vulnerable conclusion of sorts 
Does writing of my past bind me to an unchanging past-present? How do I write when there is little, 
if any, similitude? Am I left frozen in time and on my back in the dark unable to change, unable to 
transition?  
An email arrives recommending minor revisions for this essay. An email that means I must revisit my 
same flat tone many times. How may I change, let alone improve, my writing when each time I read I 
start to cry, the words dissolving on the screen like a corrupt email (McGregor2002)? I can barely 
see, let alone write. I am not enough for this. 
… Aged 5 I tried to auto-castrate in the hope that if I could be more like my sister my father might 
cease to rage. 
… Aged 14 ideation first became physical reality as I ran a blade along my arms. Real again aged 21 
and 54. 
… Aged 27 and I had stopped self-harming for 6 years. Except for when I broke a wine glass and 
drove the stem in to the palm of my left hand before raking it up and down my arm. Now I have tiny 
slivers of glass in my palm, a memorial to my friend Jason who had to go and get HIV. Who had to go 
and die aged just 25.  
… Aged 47 and I’ve started self-harming again, cutting my upper arm and my left shin. It helps me 
cope with the transphobic abuse I get. Or perhaps it merely marks it. 
… 53 and I still self-harm. Two weeks ago someone my ex sent me a series of emails; emails that I 
read in the quiet study area in the city library. They start by accusing me of being infected with HIV. 
Disgusting, degraded, polluted, I’m not a human but a vector of disease and contamination. Mere 
words on a screen that invade me; the email corrupts me. Without thinking I rake my fingernails 
along my left shin as I read, re-read and re-read again those emails. I brush hair from my face and 
smell the iron stink of blood on my fingers, under my nails. I shut down my laptop, pack up and leave. 
I need to continue but away from anyone who might ask what I’m doing and why I’m doing it. I need 
to just do this rather than think about or explain it. 
My self-harming and bad writing are not just masochistic self-flagellation – if only things were so 
simple and clean. I self-harm as a way to cope with my dysphoria rather than forget or negate it. This 
is not an ébranlement that links Thanatos with Eros through a self-destructive, ruinous intimacy 
(Bersani, 1987 and 1995). Like Yanagihara’s (2015) ‘Jude’ I self-harm to cope, cutting myself 
momentarily breaks ideation brought on through dysphoria and tethers me to my life: realising I 
literally have blood on my hands, under my fingernails, brings me back to myself. Self-harming does 
not reveal a hierophanic space where epiphany may occur (Poulos, 2006) to negate dysphoria, it is 
merely a way to cope with a life made vulnerable. Nothing negates my dysphoria, not even the 
official narratives that elide my dysphoria blues.  
Autoethnography is expected to be well written to evoke an epiphanic experience and provide an 
understanding through emotional resonance. I have never had the epiphany of a mirror experience 
that reveals me to myself as transgender – I have always been trans. This essay is not written by a 
future me made better through reflexivity but in the present by a me that continues to endure a 
vulnerable life as it repeats. What resonates through my life, hidden in the ellipses of my memories, 
are painful events I choose not to remember. They undo, rather than constitute, a different future 
me. Unlike Derrida (1995; Author, 2002) I do not ask of a deferred future self ‘when will you come?’ 
It has always been here beckoning me with the injunction ‘Come!’ in to a future I only vaguely 
glimpse and dooms me to repeat a past I would rather forget.  
Good autoethnographic writing attends to the requirements of a well presented narrative, has 
believable, 3 dimensional characters and is polyvocal in order to convince a reader of the truth of 
the story with a coherent and logical narrative. I fail at this utterly – my narrative is instead a 
monovocal argument that undoes any chance of a logical narrative in a circular account that both 
refuses similitude and questions official stories yet offers little if anything in exchange.  I am not sure 
if my bad writing is down to my ignorance, or from trying to write a processual account as I muddle 
through life. If I have any excuse for such self-indulgent writing it is because it may reveal how 
transgender has a polysemic nature that may not be understood by only reading or writing one form 
of narrative.  
I accept the label ‘bad writing’ for my work to claim and own it. If I am a bad writer so be it, I am not 
ashamed to be one, it, like being transgender, non-binary and dysphoric is what I am. This is not a 
story, it is my little life. 
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